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INTRODUCTION
“This employee is being terminated due to violation of company policy. The
employee is gay.”1
This was the reason Cracker Barrel stated for dismissing Cheryl Summerville, a cook for the restaurant chain, on her official separation notice.2
Cracker Barrel fired as many as sixteen employees pursuant to a company
policy, promulgated in January 1991, stating that it was “inconsistent with
[Cracker Barrel’s] concept and values and . . . with those of [its] customer
base, to continue to employ individuals . . . whose sexual preferences fail to
demonstrate normal heterosexual values which have been the foundation of
families in our society.”3 In the face of criticism and a boycott by various
groups, namely, the Atlanta chapter of Queer Nation, the Company rescinded
its policy; however, at the time of the statement, the fired employees had not
been rehired.4 Concerned about the impact of the adverse public reaction on
Cracker Barrel’s sales, the New York City Comptroller’s and Finance
Commissioner’s offices, as trustees of several of the city’s pension funds that
collectively owned about $3 million of Cracker Barrel stock, submitted a
shareholder proposal on behalf of the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, requesting that the company formally prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation.5 In a no-action letter, “the [SEC] not only
agreed that the proposal could be excluded” from the company’s proxy
materials but also outlined a new standard—the “Cracker Barrel Standard”—
which dictated that employment-based shareholder proposals would “always be
excludable by corporations,” even if they implicated “significant social policy
issues.”6 The 1992 Cracker Barrel shareholder proposal was the first of its kind

1 John Howard, The Cracker Barrel Restaurants, in CAROL HARVEY & M. JUNE A LLARD,
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING DIVERSITY 187, 188 (5th ed. 2011).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id. at 188 (“We have re-visited our thinking on the subject and feel it only makes good
business sense to continue to employ those folks who will provide the quality service our
customers have come to expect.”).
5 Id. at 189-90; Joseph A. Roy, Non-Traditional Activism: Using Shareholder Proposals to Urge
LGBT Nondiscrimination Protection, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1513, 1523-24 (2009).
6 Roy, supra note 5, at 1524.
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to raise the issue of LGBT employment protections7—after the SEC’s noaction letter, it could have been the last. However, almost twenty years after
the SEC’s decision, the use of shareholder proposals to garner workplace
protections for LGBT individuals has been extraordinarily successful.
This Comment explores the use of shareholder proposals for implementing
reforms of corporate nondiscrimination policies as they affect LGBT
employees. It argues that, particularly in the absence of comprehensive
statutory employment protections for LGBT individuals, shareholder
proposals have been an extremely effective tool for activists and interested
shareholders to effect employment protections for LGBT employees.
Part I provides background on the extent of LGBT workplace discrimination and solutions promulgated to address the problem, including statutory
measures and corporate nondiscrimination policies. Part II explains the
history and use of shareholder proposals to garner LGBT employment
protections. Part III describes the shareholder proposals filed between 2005
and 2012 that sought to either add or remove LGBT employment protections. Lastly, Part IV outlines the arguments typically used by shareholderproponents of proposals seeking to add or remove LGBT employment
protections and the SEC’s historical treatment of such proposals.
I. LGBT WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Prevalence of LGBT Workplace Discrimination
LGBT individuals have faced a long and pervasive history of discrimination in society, particularly in the workplace. A 2012 study consolidating the
findings of surveys, experiments, courts, administrative agencies, and
legislatures on LGBT employment discrimination found the following:
•

“As recently as 2008, the General Social Survey found that of the nationally
representative sample of LG people, 37 percent had experienced workplace
harassment in the last five years, and 12 percent had lost a job because
of their sexual orientation;”8

•

“As recently as 2011, 90 percent of respondents to the largest survey of
transgender people to date reported having experienced harassment or
mistreatment at work, or had taken actions to avoid it, and 47 percent

7
8

Id. at 1523.
Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against
LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012).
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reported having been discriminated against in hiring, promotion, or job
retention because of their gender identity;”9
•

Numerous reports of employment discrimination against LGBT people
have been found in court cases, state and local administrative complaints,
complaints to community-based organizations, academic journals, newspapers and other media, and books;10 and

•

Discrimination and harassment in the workplace can have a negative impact
on the wages and mental and physical health of LGBT people.11

B. Statutory Solutions to LGBT Workplace Discrimination
1. Federal Approaches
Despite the prevalence of LGBT workplace discrimination, efforts to
develop a federal statutory approach have been largely unavailing. There is
currently no federal statute explicitly prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.12 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on “race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin.”13 Since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that established gender stereotyping
as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII,14 some lower federal courts
have begun to extend this holding to offer Title VII protections to LGBT
individuals.15 However, such an interpretation has not been uniform among
the federal circuits.16
“[F]ederal legislators have [unsuccessfully] sought to enact explicit protections for lesbian and gay workers consistently since 1973, introducing bills
9 Id.
10 Id.;

see also, e.g., id. at 731 (“In 2002, the U.S. Government Accountability Office compiled
a record of 4,788 state administrative complaints alleging employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation or gender identity filed between 1993 and 2001.”).
11 Id. at 721; see also, e.g., id. at 737-38 (“Transgender respondents to a 2011 national survey
were unemployed at twice the rate of the general population, and 15 percent reported a household
income of under $10,000 per year.”).
12 Id. at 742.
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
14 See 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case
proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff ’s gender into account.”).
15 Pizer et al., supra note 8, at 746-47.
16 Cf. id. (“Indeed, this sound principle [acknowledging the relationship between gender
identity / sexual orientation and gender discrimination] now governs in at least five circuits.”).
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in [nearly] every Congress since 1994.”17 The current version of the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013 (ENDA),18 which was
first introduced in 1994, would extend current federal employment protections to individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity,
with exceptions for religious organizations and small businesses (those with
fewer than fifteen employees).19 In 2007, a version of the bill, which only
offered protections for sexual orientation, passed in the House but failed in
the Senate.20 The current version of the bill, which includes protections for
transgender individuals, passed in the Senate on November 7, 2013, and, at
the time of publication, is under review by the House Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections.21
2. State and Local Approaches
Despite the absence of comprehensive federal protections, many state
and local governments have passed laws offering employment protections to
LGBT employees in their jurisdictions. As of June 2013, seventeen states
and the District of Columbia prohibited discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, and four states prohibited employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation alone.22 As of 2012, of the states
that did not offer statutory protection for both sexual orientation and
gender identity, eleven had gubernatorial executive orders that “prohibit[ed]
discrimination on either or both bases against state employees,” though
these executive orders “provide[d] limited enforcement opportunities and

17
18

Id. at 760-61.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 815, 113th
Cong. (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-discrimination-act (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)
(providing basic information about EDNA, such as its purpose and limitations).
19 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 18.
20 Julie Bolcer, With Senate Hearing, Hope for a Jumpstart on ENDA, ADVOCATE.COM (June
12, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2012/06/12/senate-hearing-hope-jumpstart-enda.
21 Bill Summary & Status 113th Cong. (2013–2014) S. 815, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:s.815: (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); Bill Summary & Status
113th Cong. (2013–2014) H.R. 1755, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.1755: (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); see also Ben de Guzman, Red-Letter Day,
HUFFPOST: GAY VOICES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-de-guzman/redletter-day_b_4256707.html.
22 State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., NATIONAL G AY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (showing a color-coded map of the United States that displays states
that ban sexual orientation discrimination and those that ban both sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination).
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lack[ed] permanency.”23 In addition to statewide employment protections,
by 2012, at least 200 cities and counties prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or both.24
State and local laws, however, are limited in their ability to fully protect
LGBT employees. First, local resource and capacity constraints may limit
enforcement of such laws.25 Second, state and local laws have also been
highly vulnerable to repeal.26 For example, “[i]n 2011, the Tennessee legislature passed a law prohibiting local governments from adopting broader
antidiscrimination ordinances or policies than provided for by state law.”27
This law, in turn, overturned a Nashville ordinance prohibiting discrimination by city contractors on the basis of sexual orientation.28
C. Corporate Nondiscrimination Policies
Despite the patchwork statutory protections for LGBT employees, corporations are increasingly amending their nondiscrimination policies to
include sexual orientation, gender identity, or both. Between 2002 and 2013,
the percentage of Fortune 500 companies with sexual orientation and gender
identity nondiscrimination policies increased from 61% to 88% and 3% to 57%,
respectively.29 In fact, 2013 was the first year in which “a majority of the
Fortune 500 [companies] include[d] both sexual orientation and gender
identity protections.”30 An increasing number of companies are also instituting other LGBT-friendly employment policies—for example, in 2013, 62%
of Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partner health benefits.31

23
24
25

Pizer et al., supra note 8, at 756.
Id. at 757.
Id. (“Several academic studies demonstrate that state and local administrative agencies
often lack the resources, knowledge, enforcement mechanisms, or willingness to accept and
investigate sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination complaints.”).
26 Id. at 758-59 (“From 1974 to 2009, over 120 ballot measures sought to repeal or prevent
laws against sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination. Half of these measures passed.”).
27 Id. at 759.
28 Id.
29 See infra Table 1.
30 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2013, at 6
(2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/CorporateEqualityIndex_2013.pdf.
31 See infra Table 2.
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Table 1: Percentage of Companies with Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity in Corporate Nondiscrimination
Policies Among the Fortune 50032
2002

2008

2013

Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policy

61%

88%

88%

Gender Identity in Nondiscrimination Policy

3%

25%

57%

Table 2: Percentage of Companies with LGBT-Friendly Employment
Policies Among the Fortune 50033
2013
Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policy

88%

Gender Identity in Nondiscrimination Policy

57%

Domestic Partner Health Benefits

62%

Transgender-Inclusive Benefits

25%

Organizational Competency Practices

42%

Public Commitment to the LGBT Community

48%

Activists and other interested parties have used several tools to spur
companies to adopt nondiscrimination policies. Each seeks to align the goals
of the company’s management with those of interested stakeholders. Three
such tools are particularly notable. First, employee advocacy groups have
motivated internal discussions between employees and management about
employment policies. Second, the Human Rights Campaign’s Corporate
Equality Index has brought attention to companies’ LGBT employment
policies and has been an important tool for consumers and prospective
employees seeking to purchase from or work for an LGBT-friendly company.
Since 2002, the Human Rights Campaign has published its annual Corporate Equality Index, which rates companies based on LGBT-friendly
employment policies.34 Though the index has traditionally focused on the
presence of sexual orientation and gender identity in companies’ equal
employment opportunity (EEO) policies, more recent publications have
covered other practices, such as providing domestic partner and
transgender-inclusive health benefits, requiring organizational LGBT
competency (for example, through employee training), and making a “public

32
33
34

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 6.
Id. at 9.
See id. at 10, 12.
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commitment to equality for the LGBT community.”35 Businesses that
receive a one-hundred percent rating on the Corporate Equality Index are
named “Best Places to Work for LGBT Equality”—a distinction that may
help them recruit employees.36 Third, shareholder proposals, the focus of
this Comment, have been effective at raising shareholders’ concerns regarding LGBT issues. As discussed further in Part II, such proposals allow
shareholders to publicize these issues in the company’s proxy materials and
bring them to a shareholder vote. Such proposals have been extraordinarily
successful at influencing companies to adopt sexual orientation and gender
identity nondiscrimination policies.37
II. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
A. Shareholder Proposals Generally
Corporate law has traditionally viewed shareholders as the owners of the
corporation and viewed the managers and board of directors as their
agents.38 Shareholders can influence company decisionmaking in a variety of
ways, including electing directors, voting on extraordinary business matters
(e.g., mergers, major asset sales, and dissolution), and approving changes to
the bylaws or articles of incorporation.39 Shareholders can also influence
corporate decisionmaking through shareholder proposals—resolutions
advanced by and for the consideration of the shareholders.40 These proposals typically come in two varieties: (1) “[g]overnance proposals[, which]
focus on traditional management issues such as executive compensation . . . and
voting requirements” and (2) “[s]ocial proposals[, which] call for reports or
policy changes on social or environmental issues that can impact a company’s
bottom line.”41 Though many shareholder proposals are nonbinding,42 and few
receive a majority shareholder vote, they are nonetheless effective at bringing
shareholders’ concerns to the attention of management and the public.43
35
36
37
38

Id. at 12.
Id. at 10.
See infra subsection III.B.4.
Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of
Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corporate
Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 937 (2005).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Understanding Shareholder Votes, AS Y OU SOW: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ,
http://www.asyousow.org/csr/understandingvote.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
42 Id.
43 Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 38, at 937-38.
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Shareholder proponents can submit proposals in two different ways. They
can send the proposals at their own expense to the other shareholders.44
Alternatively, shareholders can opt to use Rule 14a-8 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which, if certain criteria are satisfied, requires a
company to “include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and
identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an
annual or special meeting of shareholders.”45 Most shareholders opt for the
latter option, since the former is usually cost-prohibitive.46
B. Requirements for Submitting a Shareholder Proposal
There are several requirements for successfully submitting a shareholder
proposal for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. First, a shareholder
must have “continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the
company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for
at least one year by the date [he] submit[ted] the proposal.”47 Second,
“[e]ach shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company
for a particular shareholders’ meeting.”48 Third, “[t]he proposal, including
any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.”49
Fourth, the company must receive the proposal by the deadline determined
in accordance with Rule 14a-8(e).50 Failure to adhere to the requirements
may result in exclusion of the proposal if the shareholder proponent does
not remedy any deficiency after being notified by the company.51 Additionally, the company may be permitted to exclude the shareholder proponent’s
proposal from the proxy materials for the subsequent two calendar years if
the shareholder proponent or a qualified representative fails, without good
cause, to appear and present the proposal at the shareholders’ meeting.52
C. Excluding a Shareholder Proposal from the Proxy Materials
In addition to procedural exclusion, a company can also exclude a shareholder proposal on substantive grounds.53 If a company intends to exclude a
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Roy, supra note 5, at 1517.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2013); see also Roy, supra note 5, at 1517.
Roy, supra note 5, at 1517.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
Id. § 240.14a-8(d).
Id. § 240.14a-8(e).
Id. § 240.14a-8(f).
Id. § 240.14a-8(h).
See infra Table 3.
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shareholder proposal, it must file its reasons with the SEC and provide a
copy to the shareholder proponent no later than eighty days before it files
its definitive proxy statement with the SEC.54 The company may also seek a
no-action letter from the SEC.55 The “‘no-action’ process” is an informal
procedure that enables the company “to obtain the informal views of the
SEC staff on proposed transactions that appear to raise compliance issues
under applicable federal securities laws and the rules thereunder.”56 The
SEC may respond to the company favorably, adversely, or refuse to respond
on the merits.57 A favorable no-action letter may state that the SEC “will
not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if [the company]
omits the proposal from its proxy materials” based on the rule relied upon
in the company’s request for a no-action letter.58 An adverse no-action letter
may state that the SEC is “unable to concur in [the company’s] view that [it]
may exclude the proposal” based on the rule relied upon in the company’s
request for a no-action letter.59 A reply of “no response on the merits” from
the SEC may state that “the staff has indicated that legal, policy, or practical
considerations may make it inappropriate for it to respond on the merits of
a no-action request.”60
Part IV discusses the particular substantive grounds that companies have
tried to use to modify or exclude proposals concerning nondiscrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j).
Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1019 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 1031.
E.g., Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 36455, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2012).
E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 977660, at *1 (Mar. 20, 2012).
See Lemke, supra note 55, at 1033.
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Table 3: Substantive Grounds for Excluding Shareholder
Proposals Under Rule 14a-861
Rule

Description

14a-8(i)(1)
14a-8(i)(2)
14a-8(i)(3)
14a-8(i)(4)
14a-8(i)(5)
14a-8(i)(6)
14a-8(i)(7)
14a-8(i)(8)
14a-8(i)(9)
14a-8(i)(10)
14a-8(i)(11)
14a-8(i)(12)
14a-8(i)(13)

Improper under state law
Violation of law
Violation of proxy rules
Personal grievance; special interest
Relevance
Absence of power or authority
Management functions
Director elections
Conflicts with company’s proposal
Already substantially implemented
Duplication
Resubmissions
Specific amount of dividends

D. Literature on Shareholder Proposals
Existing literature on shareholder proposals has focused almost exclusively on the results of shareholder votes in evaluating the efficacy of
shareholder proposals as a tool for effecting corporate change. This literature generally reports the following:
•

61
62

Corporate governance proposals typically receive a greater level of
shareholder participation than do social policy proposals, which may
indicate that shareholders believe corporate governance proposals are
more connected to firm value;62

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2013).
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 185-86 (2001) (“[I]n 1994, social
responsibility proposals rarely received more than 20% of the vote while corporate governance
proposals at times received 40% . . . . In addition, although no social responsibility proposal has
ever passed . . . the number of corporate governance proposals obtaining a majority . . . increase[d]
dramatically in the 1990s . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter,
Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market
Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 370 (2007) (“[N]umerous studies have differentiated between
corporate governance proposals, which directly relate to issues affecting shareholder value and receive
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•

The type of shareholder proponent influences shareholder support of
the proposals. Institutional investors, for example, tend to garner more
support for their proposals than do individuals or religious organizations;63

•

The precatory nature of shareholder proposals results in only certain
types of proposals effecting actual change, regardless of the outcome of
a shareholder vote;64 and

•

Stock ownership by “insiders” (e.g., corporate management and directors) reduces support for shareholder proposals.65

941

There is relatively little scholarship that focuses on social policy shareholder resolutions. In 1999, N.K. Chidambaran and Tracie Woidtke found
“that a larger percentage of social issue proposals is withdrawn compared to
corporate governance proposals.”66 In 2006, Paula Tkac analyzed social
policy resolutions filed between 1999 and 2002 and concluded that withdrawal of a resolution generally indicates negotiation with management,
finding that “almost 80 percent [of withdrawn proposals] resulted in a
concrete corporate response.”67 In 2012, Miguel Rojas identified factors that
typically increase the chances of withdrawal—for example, (1) certain issues,
such as equal employment, tend to result in negotiated settlement and (2)
the percentage of votes received by a resolution in the prior year is positively
correlated to the likelihood of withdrawal.68
Despite Rojas’s findings on equal employment proposals generally, there
has been little academic research on the use of shareholder proposals to
significant shareholder support, and social responsibility proposals, where the connection to firm
value is more tenuous and which attract low levels of shareholder approval.” (citation omitted)).
63 See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 285, 288 (2000) (“On average,
proposals sponsored by institutional or coordinated investors receive over 175% as many votes as
those sponsored by individuals.”).
64 E.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 62, at 371.
65 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 62, at 185 (“[T]he percentage of votes cast for shareholder
proposals is negatively related to insider ownership and positively related to institutional
ownership.”).
66 N.K. Chidambaran & Tracie Woidtke, The Role of Negotiations in Corporate Governance:
Evidence from Withdrawn Shareholder-Initiated Proposals 7-8 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working
Paper No. CLB-99-012, 1999).
67 Paula Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder Proposals, FED.
RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., Third Quarter 2006, at 18-19.
68 See Miguel Rojas et al., What Explains a Negotiated Outcome for Social Policy Shareholder
Resolutions?, MGMT. REV.: INT’ L J., Summer 2012, at 17, 37-39 (showing positive and significant
correlations to withdrawal for some, but not all, resolutions addressing social policy issues, and
resolutions that received broad shareholder support in the past year).
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implement nondiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation and
gender identity. Existing research has not quantified the efficacy of shareholder proposals seeking LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, but rather has
focused on specific areas of discrimination, such as employee benefits. For
example, examining case studies of LGBT-inclusive proposals, Nicole
Raeburn notes that shareholder proposals on such nondiscrimination
measures as domestic partner–benefits policies can create tangible policy
changes even without a shareholder vote.69 On the other hand, Danielle
Dale, focusing solely on the ability of shareholder proposals to initiate a
shareholder vote on an issue, concludes that the proposals “lack any real teeth
in regards to amending corporate employment discrimination policies.”70
This Comment contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the
content and outcome of shareholder proposals that seek to add, remove, or
modify LGBT nondiscrimination policies.71 Additionally, it analyzes shareholder proponents’ and boards of directors’ arguments for or against implementing such proposals.72 Lastly, it examines the SEC’s response to no-action
letter requests concerning these proposals and shows that the SEC has
made extensive value judgments on LGBT-exclusive resolutions through a
line-editing approach that is unique among social policy shareholder proposals.73 This Comment concludes that shareholder proposals have been
essential in securing workplace protections for members of the LGBT
community, particularly in lieu of comprehensive statutory protections.
This Comment is consistent with prior literature on social policy shareholder resolutions, which suggests that withdrawal of a resolution generally
indicates a successful settlement and a “concrete corporate response.”74
However, this Comment goes further in analyzing outcomes by tracking the
ultimate success of proposals that are not initially adopted. This is important considering that, though thirty percent of LGBT-inclusive resolutions are initially unsuccessful, sixty-four percent of those failed resolutions
69 NICOLE C. RAEBURN, CHANGING CORPORATE A MERICA FROM INSIDE OUT : LESBIAN AND GAY WORKPLACE RIGHTS 132 (2004) (“Employee activists have a far greater chance

of winning equitable policies when their companies are subject to gay-inclusive nondiscrimination
statutes, boycotts, lawsuits, or shareholder action.”).
70 Danielle R. Dale, Note, Gender Identity Protection: The Inadequacy of Shareholder Action to
Amend Corporate Employment Discrimination Policies, 36 IOWA J. CORP. L. 469, 492 (2011).
71 See infra Part III.
72 See infra Part IV.
73 Id.
74 Tkac, supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Rojas et al., supra note 68, at 21-22
(“[W]e saw the initiation of a shareholder proposal as being part of an ongoing process of
negotiations between shareholders and management. Only when an agreement cannot be reached
by the parties, is the proposal put to a vote.”).
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are ultimately adopted.75 This suggests the importance of sustained shareholder advocacy at effecting change. Sustained negotiations between
shareholders and companies as well as publicity raised by shareholder
proposals could contribute to their success. This Comment also describes
the SEC’s current stance toward employment-based shareholder proposals.
In contrast to the Cracker Barrel Standard employed twenty years ago, which
rendered virtually all employment-based proposals excludable under the
“ordinary business operations exclusion,”76 such proposals concerning
nondiscrimination policies are now rarely excluded.77 Today, the ordinary
business operations exclusion is generally triggered only for LGBT-inclusive
proposals that espouse broad concepts of nondiscrimination touching such
areas as marketing and corporate strategy.78 Attempts to exclude LGBTexclusive proposals have also been rebuffed by the SEC, primarily through
line-editing. This may reflect a baseline position that nondiscrimination
proposals are prima facie includable in companies’ proxy materials, but that
proxy materials should not be a platform for voicing broad, inflammatory
social and political judgments. Whether a statement is too inflammatory to be
included is a case-by-case value judgment without a clear, objective standard.
III. LGBT-NONDISCRIMINATION-POLICY SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS, 2005–2012
A. Methodology and Overview of Sample
To explore shareholder proposals that seek to add or remove sexual orientation or gender identity from companies’ nondiscrimination policies,
data were compiled from multiple sources to analyze (1) shareholder
proposals from 2005–2012 and (2) SEC no-action letters from 2000–2012.
For the purposes of this Comment, shareholder resolutions that seek
to add sexual orientation, gender identity, or both to a company’s nondiscrimination policy are described as “LGBT-inclusive.” Shareholder
resolutions that seek to remove sexual orientation or gender identity
from a company’s nondiscrimination policy are described as “LGBTexclusive.” The terms “nondiscrimination policies” and “equal employment opportunity . . . policies” are used interchangeably.

75
76
77
78

See infra Tables 6 & 7.
Roy, supra note 5, at 1524.
See generally infra Tables 10 & 13.
See Roy, supra note 5, at 1513-14, 1526-27.
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1. Sources of Shareholder Resolutions
A database of 248 LGBT-inclusive and LGBT-exclusive shareholder
proposals, filed between 2005 and 2012, was created using the following
resources:
•

SEC EDGAR System: The SEC’s EDGAR system collects and maintains forms and documents disclosed by public companies and permits
a full-text search for items disclosed during the past four years.79
Schedule 14A filings and SEC no-action letters were searched using the
terms “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to find pertinent
shareholder proposals. Filings were individually examined to ensure relevance to this study. The EDGAR system compiles only shareholder proposals that are publicly filed by the company—for example, proposals that
were withdrawn by the shareholder prior to disclosure in a Schedule 14A
filing—necessitating the use of voluntary shareholder disclosure to fill in
the gaps.

•

Proxy Preview: Proxy Preview is an annual report published by As You
Sow, an organization that “promotes environmental and social corporate responsibility.”80 The report provides an overview of environmental and social shareholder resolutions filed in anticipation of the proxy
season.81 Proxy Preview reports published in the years between 2005 and
2012 were used to populate the study’s shareholder resolution database.82
The reports provide information about the shareholder proponent, the
company, the proposal’s content, and meeting date or status of the proposal (e.g., withdrawn, passed).83

79 Search the Next-Generation EDGAR System, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
80 About As You Sow, AS YOU SOW, http://www.asyousow.org/about (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
81 PROXY PREVIEW, http://www.proxypreview.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); see also HEIDI
WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2012, at 2-5, http://asyousow.org/
publications/2012/ProxyPreview2012_20120319.pdf [hereinafter PROXY PREVIEW 2012].
82 PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81; HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY
PREVIEW 2011, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/ProxyPreview_2011.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU
SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2010, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2010%20articles/ProxyPreview2010.pdf;
HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2009, http://www.asyousow.org/
publications/ProxyPreview_2009.pdf; HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY
PREVIEW 2008, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/proxy-preview-2008.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF,
AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2007, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2007_proxy_preview.pdf;
MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2006, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/
2006_proxy_preview.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2005,
http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2005_proxy_preview.pdf.
83 See, e.g., PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 27 tbl.
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Shareholder-Proponent Publications: Information about shareholder
resolutions was also compiled from the websites and publications of the
following shareholder-proponents of resolutions for LGBT-inclusive EEO
policies84: Calvert Investments,85 the New York City Pension Funds,86
Pride Foundation,87 Trillium Asset Management,88 the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations,89 and Walden Asset Management.90

84 There may be selection bias to the extent that shareholder proponents who report their
activism activities (and are thus included in the data used in this report) have different results than
other shareholder proponents. For example, individual shareholders may be underrepresented in
this dataset, and may have a weaker capacity to influence change with shareholder proposals than
institutional shareholders.
85 Sustainable and Responsible Investing: Calvert’s Shareholder Resolutions: Historical Record,
CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri-resolutions-history.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2014).
86 NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2012 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES OF THE NEW
YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/2012-Shareholder-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2012 NYC PENSION FUND P OSTSEASON
REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2011 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES OF THE NEW
YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/2011-Shareholder-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON
REPORT]; COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE 2010 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2010-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2010 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, THE 2009
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2009-Shareholderreport.pdf [hereinafter 2009 NYC PENSION FUND P OSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY
COMPTROLLER, THE 2008 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY
PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/
uploads/documents/2008-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2008 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON
REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, POSTSEASON REPORT: 2007 SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSAL PROGRAMS & OTHER SHAREOWNERSHIP INITIATIVES OF THE NEW YORK CITY
PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/
uploads/documents/2007-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2007 NYC PENSION FUND
POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION
FUNDS’ 2006 SHAREHOLDER P ROPOSALS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/documents/2006-shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2006 NYC PENSION FUND
POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2005 PROXY INITIATIVES OF
THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION F UNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/documents/2005-shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2005 NYC PENSION FUND
POSTSEASON REPORT].
87 Shareholder Advocacy, PRIDE FOUND., http://www.pridefoundation.org/what-we-do/initiatives/
shareholder-activism (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
88 2011 Resolutions at a Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/
uncategorized/2011-resolutions-at-a-glance (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); Trillium’s 2010 Shareholder
Resolutions At-A-Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/news-articlescategory/advocacy-news-articles/2010-shareholder-resolutions-at-a-glance (last visited Feb. 21, 2014);
2009 Shareholder Advocacy At-A-Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/
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2. Attributes of Shareholder Resolutions

Data on the shareholder resolutions and the companies for which they
were filed were compiled from: Schedule 14A filings, Form 8-K and Form
10-Q filings, the Hoovers database,91 company websites, the Human Rights
Campaign (HRC) Equality Index,92 and news articles.
Table 4: Attributes of Shareholder Resolutions and Sources
Attribute

Source(s)

Proxy season year

Schedule 14A Filings

Content of proposal (LGBT exclusive versus LGBT inclusive)

Schedule 14A Filings

Protections advocated for in shareholder proposal (sexual orientation
only, gender identity only, both sexual orientation and gender identity)

Schedule 14A Filings

Arguments in favor of resolution by the shareholder proponent

Schedule 14A Filings

Arguments in favor against resolution by the board of directors

Schedule 14A Filings

Name of shareholder proponent

Schedule 14A Filings

Results of shareholder votes (percentage of votes in favor of the
resolution and whether the resolution passed)

Form 8-K and 10-Q Filings

Year that sexual orientation or gender identity protections were
implemented

Company websites, HRC
Equality Index, News articles

3. SEC No-Action Letters
In addition, SEC no-action letters issued between 2000 and 2012 regarding
requests by companies to omit LGBT-inclusive or LGBT-exclusive shareholder resolutions from proxy materials were collected and examined. These
no-action letters generally contain the entire correspondence among the
shareholder proponent, the company, and the SEC regarding the omission
of the shareholder resolution, as well as the final decision by the SEC and
the statutory basis for that decision.

news-articles-category/advocacy-news-articles/2009-shareholder-advocacy-at-a-glance (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014).
89 Shareholder Advocacy, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASS’N OF CONGREGATIONS,
http://www.uua.org/finance/investment/sri/shareholderadvocacy/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
90 Shareholder Resolution History, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/
investing-for-Change/shareholder_resolution_history (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
91 HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
92 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, supra note 30.
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B. Analysis of Shareholder Proposals
1. Proponents of Shareholder Resolutions
In 2012, the primary filers of social and environmental resolutions were
pension funds (27%), socially responsible investors (SRIs) (27%), faith-based
institutions (11%), special interest groups (10%), individuals (9%), unions
(8%), and foundations (4%).93 As discussed below, whereas LGBT-inclusive
proposals come from a variety of the groups listed above, LGBT-exclusive
proposals come only from individual shareholders.
a. Shareholder Proponents of LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
The New York City Common Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) is the leading
pension fund filer, if not the leading filer of LGBT-inclusive resolutions.94
The Fund “filed the first shareholder proposal addressing sexual orientation
discrimination at Cracker Barrel”95 and as the “lead proponent of a filing
group,” submitted resolutions at Exxon Mobil advocating for sexual orientation and gender identity protection.96
The following SRIs have been most active in filing LGBT-inclusive resolutions: Walden Asset Management, Calvert Investments, and Trillium
Asset Management.97 These investors generally adopt a multipronged approach
to sustainable and responsible investing, incorporating the company’s stances
on social issues into their investment criteria, leveraging their stock ownership to engage in dialogue with companies and file shareholder resolutions,
and exercising their clients’ positions on social issues through proxy voting.98
Institutional shareholders with large holdings in a company, such as pension funds and SRIs, often have the greatest ability to effect policy change
in the company. According to Shelley Alpern, Assistant Vice President of

93
94

PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 6.
See 2012 NYC PENSION FUND P OSTSEASON REPORT, supra note 86, at 6. The New
York City Comptroller oversees the Fund, which consists of five New York City pension funds—
the New York City Board of Education Retirement System, the New York City Employees’ Retirement
System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New York City Police Pension Fund,
and the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System. Id. at 1. As of May 2012, the value of the portfolio
was roughly $150.3 billion. Lila Shapiro, Thomas DiNapoli, N.Y. Comptroller, Pushes Expanded Protections for
LGBT Workers at ExxonMobil, HUFFPOST: GAY VOICES, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/24/
thomas-dinapoli-exxonmobil-lgbt_n_1543783.html (last updated May 25, 2012, 2:23 PM).
95 PROXY PREVIEW 2011, supra note 82, at 18.
96 Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 67 (Apr. 12, 2012).
97 See PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 6.
98 See, e.g., Shareholder Engagement, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/
Investing-for-Change/shareholder-engagement (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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Trillium Asset Management, “The advantage of having an institutional
holder file these resolutions is that companies always return their phone
calls. If they want dialogue, they get it.”99 Noninstitutional shareholders
(e.g., the Pride Foundation, an LGBT philanthropic foundation, and the
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations, a faith-based institution) have also been active in filing LGBT-inclusive resolutions.100
b. Shareholder Proponents of LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions
In contrast to the organized shareholder activism surrounding LGBTinclusive resolutions discussed in the previous subsection, LGBT-exclusive
resolutions are often filed by individuals who tend to have a small stock
ownership in the company.101 Though these shareholder proponents may
meet the minimum stock ownership necessary to file a shareholder resolution, they often lack the leverage necessary to engage the company’s officers
and directors in meaningful dialogue to amend their policies.
2. Content of Proposals
The vast majority of shareholder resolutions to add or remove LGBT
categories from a company’s EEO policy are LGBT-inclusive resolutions.102
Though prior to 2008, the majority of LGBT-inclusive resolutions advocated
for adding only sexual orientation to a company’s EEO policy, most of the
recently filed shareholder resolutions have sought protections either for only
gender identity (for companies that already have sexual orientation protection) or for both sexual orientation and gender identity.103 This likely
reflects changing social mores about transgender rights; LGBT political
changes, which began in the 1990s and led toward more inclusion of

99 Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 38, at 938.
100 See PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at

27 tbl. (chronicling diversity proposals and
their proponents).
101 Compare AmSouth Bancorp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 37-38 (Mar.
16, 2006) (stating that the shareholder proponent of an LGBT-inclusive resolution, Walden Asset
Management, owned 606,797 shares of AmSouth Bancorporation stock), with Am. Express Co.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Mar. 22, 2006) (noting that the shareholder
proponent of an LGBT-exclusive resolution, Mr. Thomas Strobhar, owned fifty shares of
American Express Co. stock).
102 See infra Table 5 (demonstrating that only 11 LGBT-exclusive resolutions were filed between 2005 and 2012, compared to 237 LGBT-inclusive resolutions).
103 See id. (exhibiting a drastic increase in sexual orientation and gender identity LGBTinclusive resolutions beginning in 2008 and a concurrent drop in sexual orientation–only LGBTinclusive resolutions, which dropped to zero after 2009).
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transgender individuals;104 and the seemingly minimal impact that gender
identity inclusion in shareholder resolutions has on ultimate voting results.105
Between 2005 and 2012, there were 248 LGBT-exclusive and LGBTinclusive shareholder resolutions filed—11 LGBT-exclusive resolutions and
237 LGBT-inclusive resolutions.106 This amounts to, on average, slightly
more than one LGBT-exclusive resolution per year (with a peak of 5 such
resolutions in 2006) compared to just over 29 LGBT-inclusive resolutions
per year (with a peak of 40 such resolutions in 2009).107 These resolutions
were submitted to a total of 186 companies between 2005 and 2012: 177
companies received LGBT-inclusive resolutions and 9 companies received
LGBT-exclusive resolutions.108
Of the 237 shareholder resolutions in favor of LGBT-inclusive EEO
policies, 59 (25%) sought only sexual orientation protection, 41 (17%) sought
only gender identity protection, and 137 (58%) sought both.109 Resolutions
advocating for protections of only sexual orientation dropped precipitously
in 2008, in favor of resolutions concerning both sexual orientation and
gender identity.110 For example, in 2005, 22 of 26 LGBT-inclusive resolutions advocated for only sexual orientation protections, while in 2012, 25 of
29 LGBT-inclusive resolutions sought both sexual orientation and gender
identity protections.111

104 See, e.g., Amy L. Stone, More Than Adding a T: American Lesbian and Gay Activists’ Attitudes Towards Transgender Inclusion, 12 SEXUALITIES 334, 335-336 (2009) (“Although gender
variant individuals have always participated in the LGBT movement, there was a consolidation of
transgender inclusion in the American LGBT movement in the mid-1990s.” (citation omitted)).
105 See infra Table 8 (displaying an average vote for LGBT-inclusive resolutions of 29.6%
(sexual orientation only), 24.2% (gender identity only), and 31.6% (sexual orientation and gender
identity)).
106 Infra Table 5. There is no way to determine the total number of shareholder resolutions
that were actually filed, because the data relies on self-disclosure by companies or shareholder
proponents. The total number of resolutions I include is thus constrained.
107 Id.
108 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
109 Infra Table 5.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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Table 5: Shareholder Resolutions, 2005–2012, by Content: LGBT-Inclusive
Versus LGBT-Exclusive, Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity112

Proxy Season

LGBT-Exclusive
Resolutions

Sexual
Orientation

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total 2005–2012
Average 2005–2012

1
5
2
1
0
0
1
1
11
1.375

22
19
12
5
1
0
0
0
59
7.375

LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Gender
Total Inclusive
Identity
Both
Resolutions
1
0
2
3
13
9
9
4
41
5.125

3
6
10
27
26
20
20
25
137
17.0

26
25
24
35
40
29
29
29
237
29.5

3. Outcomes of Shareholder Resolutions
This subsection argues that while LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolutions tend to fail when brought to a shareholder vote, they are generally
successful in motivating companies to reform their EEO policies.113 A
majority of companies where an LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolution
fails ultimately adopt the employment protections originally requested by
these resolutions.114 Of the LGBT-exclusive resolutions for which the
outcome of the resolution was determined, they uniformly failed to effect
removal of a company’s LGBT protections.115
Table 6 demonstrates the outcomes of LGBT-inclusive and LGBTexclusive shareholder resolutions. Of LGBT-inclusive resolutions, 59% of
proposals resulted in LGBT-inclusive changes to company policy, even
when the proposals did not actually pass at the shareholder level.116 The
most common outcome was that the resolutions were withdrawn (51%).117
Shareholders less frequently voted to pass resolutions in their entirety (2%),
or the resolutions seeking both sexual orientation and gender identity
protection were withdrawn, with the company subsequently adopting only
sexual orientation protection (5%).118 Of all LGBT-inclusive resolutions,
112
113

Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
See infra Table 7 (indicating that 64% of corporations that rejected LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolutions later adopted their own LGBT-inclusive employment policies).
114 See id.
115 See infra Table 6.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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30% were not adopted by the company, with a failed shareholder vote cited
as the most common reason (27%).119 Much of the remaining LGBTinclusive resolutions are those that were withdrawn because the company
already had an EEO policy in place that contained the protections the
resolution sought (5% of LGBT-inclusive resolutions).120
By examining shareholder proponents’ press releases, I found that 78%
of the withdrawals of LGBT-inclusive proposals were a result of negotiated
settlements with shareholders. Note that this figure is likely higher, as
shareholder proponents may not have publicized every successful advocacy
campaign.121 This figure is also consistent with the work of Paula Tkac, who
found that concrete corporate responses followed the withdrawal of 79% of
the social policy proposals in her sample.122 The strategies the shareholder
proponents employ may determine whether the company is likely to adopt
their desired policy change following the withdrawal of their proposals.
While some proponents withdraw their proposal if the company simply
opens lines of communication, many proponents of LGBT-inclusive
proposals frequently take an “all-or-nothing” approach, withdrawing their
proposals “only if the company agrees” to implement the resolution “in full.”123
Of resolutions for LGBT-exclusive EEO Policies, 73% failed by shareholder vote.124 The remaining resolutions were not put to a vote, and thus I
was unable to determine the exact outcome of these resolutions.
These statistics are consistent with Rojas’s research comparing the outcomes of U.S. social policy proposals between 2000 and 2004. Rojas found
the following outcomes for proposals addressing equal employment: 37.2%
were voted on by shareholders, 53.8% were withdrawn, 6.9% were omitted,
and 2.1% were not presented.125 According to Rojas’s research, the overall
withdrawal rate among social policy proposals during this period was 27.7%,
meaning that, at 53.8%, equal employment proposals were withdrawn with
far greater frequency than other social policy proposals.126 Correspondingly,
the rates at which equal employment proposals were voted on by shareholders
or omitted were lower than the average: 6.9% of equal employment proposals
119
120
121

Id.
Id.
See Tkac, supra note 67, at 17 (noting that “proponents [tend] to trumpet successes and
hide failures”).
122 Id. at 417.
123 CAROLYN MATHIASEN, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2013 PROXY SEASON
PREVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL ISSUES (2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/
private/2013ISSPreviewES.pdf.
124 See infra Table 6.
125 Rojas et al., supra note 68, at 32 tbl.1.
126 Id.
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were omitted versus an overall average of 15.2%, and 37.2% of equal employment proposals were voted on compared to an overall average of
54.3%.127 These findings are also consistent with Tkac’s research using social
policy proposals gathered between 1992 and 2002, which found that antidiscrimination proposals were the most likely to be withdrawn among social
policy proposals.128
The higher withdrawal rate for equal employment proposals is indicative
of these proposals’ success, due perhaps to the more active engagement of
institutional shareholders on this issue, changing social attitudes around
LGBT workplace rights, and pressure to conform to the practices of peer
companies. Equal employment proposals do not often appear on corporate
ballots, likely indicating that their proponents are generally successful at
negotiating settlements with companies. Further, this type of proposal’s
lower rate of omission likely reflects the SEC’s current stance—generally
including proposals for nondiscrimination policies, as discussed further in
Part IV.

127
128

Id.
See Tkac, supra note 67, at 18 (“Antidiscrimination proposals are the most effective or
successful. Roughly half of all these proposals are withdrawn likely because they often call for a
relatively low-cost response, such as a statement of nondiscrimination policy or a release of
information regarding EEOC practices . . . .”).
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Table 6: Outcomes of LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Versus LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions129
Outcome
Success
Majority Vote
Withdrawn

LGBT-Inclusive
Resolutions

LGBT-Exclusive
Resolutions

139 (59%)

0 (0%)

5 (2%)

0 (0%)

121 (51%)

0 (0%)

13 (5%)

0 (0%)

Failure

70 (30%)

8 (73%)

Failed by Vote

Adopted Without Gender Identity Protections130

64 (27%)

8 (73%)

SEC Permits Omission from Proxy Materials131

5 (2%)

0 (0%)

Procedural Challenge

1 (.4%)

0 (0%)

28 (12%)

3 (27%)

Other
Existing Policy132
Other
Total, 2005–2012

12 (5%)
1 (7%)
237

0 (0%)
3133

(27%)
11

However, the 30% failure rate of these resolutions is misleading when
viewed in isolation. Rather, one must look to the LGBT-inclusive EEO
policy in companies where these resolutions were filed to better analyze the
effectiveness of such advocacy. Of the 33 companies where LGBT-inclusive
resolutions failed at the shareholder level, 21 (64%) subsequently adopted

129
130

Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
These resolutions seek to add both sexual orientation and gender identity to a company’s
EEO policy. They were withdrawn in exchange for the company’s agreement to add sexual
orientation to their policy. See, e.g., 2010 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT, supra
note 86, at 15 (explaining that the Fund withdrew its resolution for EEO policies addressing both
sexual orientation and gender identity at Chesapeake Energy Corporation after the company included
sexual orientation protection and agreed “to continue dialogue on gender identity” protection).
131 The company omitted these resolutions because the SEC, after evaluating the arguments
of both the company and the shareholder proponent, determined it would not take action if the
company omitted the resolution from its proxy materials. See, e.g., Commercial Metals Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 3252421, at *1 (Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that the Office of Chief Counsel
of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance “will not recommend enforcement action to the
Commission if CMC omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10)”).
132 The shareholder proponent withdrew these resolutions because the company had a preexisting
EEO policy that satisfied the proposal’s requests. See, e.g., 2006 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON
REPORT, supra note 86, at 13 (describing how LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolutions were withdrawn
at Convergys Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, and Fortune Brands because the companies
verified preexisting policies that addressed the shareholder proponent’s recommendations).
133 These three proposals were not subject to a vote for unknown reasons.
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such policies and only 11 (33%) did not.134 Of the 21 companies that adopted
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, 10 did so as a result of shareholder action—9
in response to another shareholder resolution and 1 in direct response to a
shareholder vote.135 Of course, these findings must be viewed within the
context discussed earlier, that most—but not all—of the sample’s withdrawn
social policy resolutions have resulted in concrete corporate change.
Table 7: Outcome at Companies Where an LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy
Was Brought to a Vote and Failed or Was Omitted in
Accordance with an SEC No-Action Letter136
Outcome

Number of Companies

Proposal Resubmitted in Later Year, Withdrawn Because
Company Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy

9 (27%)

Proposal Resubmitted in Later Year, Brought to Vote and Passed

1 (3%)

Company Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy, Not Necessarily
in Response to Shareholder Proposal137

11 (33%)

Company Has Not Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy as of
Publication

11 (33%)

Other

1 (3%)138

Total, 2005—2012

33

4. Voting Statistics for Shareholder Proposals
Though both LGBT-inclusive and LGBT-exclusive resolutions generally
fail when put to a vote,139 the results of the votes are nonetheless revealing
about shareholders’ attitudes toward such resolutions and how their acceptance for such resolutions has grown over time. Two findings underscore
this increased shareholder acceptance. First, the average vote for LGBTinclusive shareholder resolutions has increased slightly over time.140 Second,
among companies where LGBT-inclusive resolutions were put to a vote

134
135
136
137

See infra Table 7.
Id.
Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
Though these eleven companies have adopted an LGBT-inclusive EEO policy, to date,
they have not implemented the specific employment protections the proposals requested.
138 This company was later acquired.
139 See supra Table 6 (showing that sixty-four of the sixty-nine LGBT-inclusive resolutions
subject to a shareholder vote between 2005 and 2012 failed to garner a majority).
140 See infra Table 9 and text accompanying note 155.
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more than once, most resolutions garnered more shareholder support in the
second round.141
LGBT-inclusive resolutions filed and voted on between 2005 and 2012
garnered an average of only 30% shareholder support.142 Shareholder
support was slightly stronger for resolutions that advocated for both sexual
orientation and gender identity protections than for those that advocated
for protections for only sexual orientation or only gender identity.143
LGBT-exclusive resolutions subject to a vote have resulted in an extraordinarily low percentage of shareholder support—an average of 3.3%.144
Table 8: Average Percentage Vote in Favor of Shareholder Resolutions,
2005–2012: LGBT-Exclusive Versus LGBT-Inclusive145
LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
LGBT-Exclusive
Resolutions

Sexual
Orientation

Gender
Identity

Both

Total Inclusive
Resolutions

3.3%

29.6%

24.2%

31.6%

30.0%

Minimum

1.8%147

1.6%148

6.3%149

2.3%150

1.6%

Maximum

6.1%

52.3%

43.2%

61.7%

61.7%

Average Vote in
146
Favor of Resolution

Number of
Resolutions

141
142
143
144
145
146

8

151

14

152

11

153

44

154

69

See infra text accompanying notes 163-66.
See infra Table 8.
Id.
Id.
Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
This figure is calculated by dividing the number of shareholder votes in favor of the resolution by the total number of votes on the resolution, discounting abstentions. Even some
resolutions that yielded greater than 50% of the vote by this calculation failed because the law of
the state of incorporation requires that abstentions be considered votes against the resolution. See,
e.g., HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 35 (Aug. 9, 2007) (“For the
proposal to pass under Delaware law, the shares in favor must exceed 50% of the total shares
present at the meeting, in person or by proxy, and entitled to vote . . . .”).
147 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 18, 2006).
148 EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Aug. 15, 2005).
149 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 28 (Sept. 4, 2008).
150 DISH Network Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 61 (Aug. 4, 2008).
151 See Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 84 (Aug. 8, 2008).
152 See Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 19 (Aug. 8, 2008).
153 See Anadarko Petroleum Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (May 21, 2012).
154 See KBR, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 24, 2011).
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Table 9 compares the average shareholder vote for LGBT-inclusive resolutions from 2005 to 2008 versus the average vote for the period from 2009
to 2012. Between 2009 and 2012, there was a slight increase in the maximum
percentage of votes in favor of LGBT-inclusive resolutions as compared to
the period between 2005 and 2008—61.7% versus 55.5%.155
Table 9: Average Percentage Vote for LGBT-Inclusive Shareholder
Resolutions, 2005–2008 Versus 2009–2012156
2005–2008

2009–2012

Total

Average Percentage Vote in Favor of LGBTInclusive Resolution

27.2%

32.6%

30.0%

Minimum

1.6%157

10.7%158

1.6%159

Maximum

55.5%160

61.7%161

61.7%162

33

36

69

Number of Resolutions

Between 2005 and 2012, there were 16 companies that put LGBTinclusive resolutions to a vote multiple times.163 Of these, 12 showed an
increase in the percentage of shareholder vote in favor of the resolutions,
while 4 showed a decrease.164 The average absolute increase of support was
9.8% across those 12 companies.165 The average absolute decrease of support
for the resolutions was 6.5% across the other 4 companies.166
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSALS BY SHAREHOLDER
PROPONENTS AND COMPANIES
This Part outlines the arguments advanced by shareholder proponents
and companies’ boards of directors for and against LGBT-inclusive and
LGBT-exclusive shareholder resolutions. Setting aside the persuasiveness
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

See infra Table 9.
Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author.
See EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., supra note 148, at 42.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (June 9, 2011).
See EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., supra note 148, at 42.
See Micron Tech., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 36 (Jan. 16, 2007).
See KBR, Inc., supra note 154, at 2.
Id.
Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. Note that the first vote and last
vote may advocate for different protections (e.g., sexual orientation only versus sexual orientation
and gender identity).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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and accuracy of these arguments, this Part also examines these arguments in
the context of the SEC’s response to requests for favorable no-action letters.
It explores, for example, which arguments advanced by shareholder proponents and boards of directors have succeeded and which have failed before
the SEC.
A. LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
1. Arguments Advanced by Shareholder Proponents in Favor of
LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Shareholder proposals in favor of instituting LGBT-inclusive resolutions typically ask companies to simply amend their nondiscrimination
policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender
identity, or both.167 However, some request that the company take a much
broader view of nondiscrimination—for example, prohibiting discrimination
not only in the hiring and firing of employees but also in corporate advertising
and corporate donations.168 To support their recommendations, shareholders
cite a variety of rationales in their proposals filed with the company’s proxy
materials. Broadly, the rationales advanced by shareholders fall into the
following four categories: (1) peer influence, (2) public opinion, (3) employeefocused, and (4) company-focused.
a. Peer Influence
Rationales leveraging peer influence typically cite statistics on the company’s peers—by revenue, size, industry, or location—that have instituted
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies or other LGBT-friendly employee benefits
or programs. For example, shareholders have highlighted the following:
•

Many similarly sized peer companies have instituted LGBT-inclusive
EEO policies, typically, citing the proportion of Fortune 500 companies,

167 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Grp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Apr. 2, 2012)
(requesting that “American Financial Group amend its written equal employment opportunity
policy to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and to
substantially implement the policy”).
168 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Mar.
20, 2008) (“A number of Fortune 500 corporations have implemented non-discrimination policies
encompassing the following principles: . . . [c]orporate advertising policy will avoid the use of
negative stereotypes based on sexual orientation or gender identity . . . [, t]here shall be no
discrimination in the sale of goods and services based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
and . . . [t]here shall be no policy barring on corporate charitable contributions to groups and
organizations based on sexual orientation.”); Murphy Oil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A), at 24 (Mar. 28, 2008) (same).
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according to the HRC Equality Index, that prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression;169
•

Many of the company’s industry peers and competitors have instituted
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies;170 and

•

Many of the company’s peers with headquarters in the same city have
instituted LGBT-inclusive EEO policies.171

Note that while I categorize the statement of a company’s existing policies as “Other” and do not label it a successful outcome in Table 6, the
confirmation that a company’s existing policies provide workplace protections for LGBT employees can also be a successful outcome, particularly
where the company’s policies are unclear.
b. Public Opinion
Shareholder proponents also argue that public opinion has shifted in
favor of equal rights in the workplace for LGBT individuals. In proposals
seeking policy change, shareholders have emphasized the following:
•

National opinion polls support providing equal workplace rights to
LGBT individuals;172

169 E.g., Am. Fin. Grp., supra note 167, at 18 (proposing a sexual orientation nondiscrimination policy and highlighting that “[o]ver 89% of the Fortune 500 companies have adopted written
nondiscrimination policies prohibiting harassment and discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation”); AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“AmSouth is increasingly alone in its
position [of lacking an explicit nondiscrimination policy], as 98% of Fortune 100 companies, and
more than 80% of the Fortune 500 companies, have adopted written nondiscrimination policies
prohibiting discrimination and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation . . . .” (internal
citation omitted)). While most shareholder proposals that employ this rationale focus solely on the
existence of written nondiscrimination policies, some also cite statistics on the percentage of
companies that utilize other methods of communicating LGBT tolerance, such as diversity
training programs, employee access to affinity groups, domestic partner health insurance, and
other LGBT-friendly employee benefits and policies. E.g., Commercial Metals Co., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 48 (Dec. 12, 2008).
170 E.g., Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 23 (Apr. 4,
2006) (“Our competitors EGL and UPS explicitly prohibit this form of discrimination in their
written policies, according to the Human Rights Campaign.”).
171 E.g., AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“Other major corporate employers in Birmingham including General Motors, Regions Financial, Saks, Inc[.], and University of Alabama, also
explicitly prohibit this form of discrimination in their written policies.”); Commercial Metals Co.,
supra note 169, at 48 (“Other major corporate employers located in Texas . . . explicitly prohibit this
form of discrimination in their written policies.”); Pentair, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A), at 41 (Mar. 23, 2007).
172 See, e.g., Advance Auto Parts, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 12 (Apr.
13, 2005) (“National public opinion polls consistently find more than three-quarters of the
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•

Increasingly, heterosexuals have supported providing equal workplace
rights to LGBT individuals;173 and

•

Many states and localities prohibit employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation, gender identity, or both.174

959

c. Employee-Focused
Employee-focused arguments describe the detrimental effects of employment discrimination on employees. These justifications have included
the following:
•

LGBT employees frequently experience discrimination in the workplace, as evidenced by recent survey data;175 and

•

“Employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation diminishes employee morale and productivity.”176

American people support equal rights in the workplace for gay men, lesbians and bisexuals.”);
Amerco, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 33 (July 18, 2012) (same).
173 See, e.g., Expeditors Int’l of Wash., supra note 170, at 23 (“According to a September 2005
survey by Harris Interactive and Witeck–Combs, 57% of heterosexual respondents consider it
extremely or very important that a company have a written non-discrimination policy that
includes sexual orientation, compared to only 43% in 2002.”).
174 E.g., Am. Fin. Grp., supra note 167, at 18 (“Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia
and more than 160 cities and counties, have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation; 12 states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”); AmSouth Bancorp., supra note
101, at 38 (“Sixteen states, the District of Columbia and more than 140 cities, including St. Louis,
have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.”); see also Anadarko
Petroleum Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 86 (Mar. 23, 2012) (“[C]ourts
have sometimes interpreted other antidiscrimination statues [sic], like those protecting individuals based
on their gender, to include gender identity . . . . [T]he jobs web site of the U.S. federal government
includes language that explicitly bans employment discrimination based on gender identity.”).
175 E.g., Advance Auto Parts, Inc., supra note 172, at 12 (“A recent National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force study has found that 16%-44% gay men and lesbians in twenty cities nationwide
experienced workplace harassment or discrimination based on their sexual orientation.”);
AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“According to a September 2002 survey by Harris
Interactive and Witeck–Combs, 41% of gay and lesbian workers in the United States reported an
experience with some form of job discrimination related to sexual orientation; almost one out of
every 10 gay or lesbian adults also stated that they had been fired or dismissed unfairly from a
previous job, or pressured to quit a job because of their sexual orientation.”).
176 E.g., DISH Network Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 32 (Apr. 25,
2008); see also HCC Ins. Holdings, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 42 (Apr.
13, 2007) (proposing a nondiscrimination policy for sexual orientation, in part, because such
discrimination “diminishes employee morale”).
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d. Company-Focused
Company-focused arguments describe the positive effects that LGBTinclusive EEO policies can have on the company’s bottom line. The following
are examples of company-focused reasons that shareholders have cited:
•

“[C]orporations that prohibit workplace discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of gender identity, have a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining employees;”177

•

“[The] company has operations in, and makes sales to, institutions in
states and cities that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;”178

•

“The company has an interest in preventing discrimination and resolving complaints internally so as to avoid costly litigation and damage its
reputation as an equal opportunity employer;”179 and

•

Some cities “have adopted legislation restricting business with companies
that do not guarantee equal treatment for gay and lesbian employees.”180

2. Companies’ Responses Against LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Proxy materials sent to shareholders not only give the shareholder proponent a platform for making arguments in favor of the resolution, but also
permit the board of directors to respond to the resolution and recommend
their own course of action.181 Boards of directors almost uniformly recommend against implementing LGBT-inclusive resolutions—I was unable to
find a single instance of a board of directors offering support for such a
resolution and only found one instance of a board of directors that declined
to respond to the proposal.182 As discussed below, boards of directors
typically advance the following arguments against these resolutions: (1) the
company’s existing EEO policy provides adequate protections; (2) the
company complies with the requirements of federal law; (3) there has been a
177
178
179

E.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp., supra note 174, at 86; Pentair, Inc., supra note 171, at 41.
E.g., AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38; Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 17.
E.g., DISH Network Corp., supra note 176, at 32; HCC Ins. Holdings, Inc., supra note
176, at 42.
180 E.g., Amerco, supra note 172, at 32; Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 17.
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m) (2013) (“The company may elect to include in its proxy
statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against [a] proposal. The company is
allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view . . . .”).
182 See Amerco, supra note 172, at 33 (affirming the company’s intolerance for discrimination
or harassment but stating that “[t]he Board makes no recommendation with respect to this
proposal” (emphasis omitted)).
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lack of shareholder support at the company and at other companies for such
proposals; or (4) other arguments regarding finance or competition.
a. Unnecessary to Revise Existing EEO Policy
The most common rationale given by companies against LGBTinclusive resolutions is that it is not necessary to revise the company’s
existing EEO policy. For example, boards have asserted the following:
•

There is no need to adopt the shareholder’s proposal because the company’s current policies provide adequate protections to LGBT individuals against discrimination;183 and

•

The company has not had any complaints filed against it for discrimination by sexual orientation or gender identity.184

b. Company Complies with the Requirements of Federal Law
Additionally, companies argue that their current EEO policies comply
with federal law and that additional protections are not necessary. For
example, companies have argued as follows:
•

Federal law does not prohibit employment discrimination on the bases
of sexual orientation and gender identity;185 and

183 See, e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 29 (Mar. 30,
2012) (“We are committed to the highest ethical standards, which include assuring equal employment
and promotional opportunities free of discrimination on any basis other than merit and performance-related
qualifications.”); W. Refining, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27 (Apr. 16, 2009)
(“Western Refining has a zero tolerance policy for any conduct that is intended to or has the effect
of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. We hire and promote on the
basis of merit and performance.”). Companies may also discuss extensively the protections in place
for other groups, seemingly to distract shareholders from the resolution’s core issue—that the
company lacks explicit protections for LGBT individuals. See, e.g., Gardner Denver, Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27 (Mar. 17, 2010) (“Our global Code of Ethics and
Business Conduct . . . expressly prohibits discrimination and harassment based on characteristics
protected by law, such as race, color, national origin, religion, gender, age, marital status, disability,
veteran status or citizenship status.”); W. Refining, Inc., supra, at 27 (“Our Code of Business
Conduct and Ethics and our Personnel Reference Manual . . . expressly prohibit discrimination,
sexual harassment or other unlawful harassment based on . . . any . . . legally-protected category
under federal, state or local law.”).
184 See, e.g., Gardner Denver, Inc., supra note 183, at 27 (“In a company with more than 6,000
employees operating in 33 countries, the Board and executive officers of the Company are not
aware of a single complaint of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity being
reported through our ethics hotline established pursuant to our Code of Ethics and Business
Conduct filed with any city, state or federal agency.”).
185 See, e.g., Commercial Metals Co., supra note 169, at 49 (“Congress has repeatedly declined
to add sexual orientation and gender identity/expression to those forms of discrimination
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The company’s current EEO policy meets the requirements of federal
law.186

c. Lack of Shareholder Support
Companies also frequently cite the failure of previous shareholder votes
on LGBT-inclusive resolutions as evidence that shareholders generally
disfavor such resolutions. For example, board responses have included the
following:
•

Previous votes for nondiscrimination policies for LGBT employees at
the company have failed;187 and

•

Previous votes for nondiscrimination policies for LGBT employees at
other companies have failed.188

d. Other Responses
Companies have also cited a variety of other reasons for their opposition
to LGBT-inclusive resolutions, including the following:
•

Providing nondiscrimination protections to LGBT employees would lead
to proponents “later seek[ing] to add domestic partner benefits to [the
Company’s] medical and other benefits plans, which could add significant
costs . . . and place the Company at a disadvantage to . . . competitors who
do not offer [such] benefits;”189

specifically prohibited under federal law.”); EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 26 (Aug. 24, 2005) (“The Board believes that adding to our written
policy additional special categories which are not prohibited by federal law undercuts our objective
of highlighting federally prohibited activities.”).
186 See, e.g., KBR, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 70 (Apr. 6, 2011) (“The
Board of Directors does not believe it is in the best interest of the company or its employees to
expand the list of personal attributes covered by KBR’s nondiscrimination policy beyond those
which are protected by federal law. To do so would, we believe, weaken the comprehensive nature
of the policy . . . .”).
187 E.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc., supra note 183, at 29 (“Leggett’s shareholders defeated similar
proposals at the Company’s last six annual meetings. We believe this consistent rejection by
shareholders sends a clear message to our Board that Leggett should oppose this unnecessary
addition to our nondiscrimination policy.”); TECO Energy, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A), at 31 (March 14, 2012) (“[L]ess than one-quarter of the votes cast at the 2011
annual meeting on this matter were for the proposal.”).
188 E.g., Commercial Metals Co., supra note 169, at 49 (“In those instances where stockholders
at other companies have been allowed to vote on proposals of this nature they generally have not
received majority support.”).
189 E.g., id. at 49; Leggett & Platt, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27
(Mar. 27, 2008).
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•

There is no evidence that the lack of a nondiscrimination policy for
LGBT employees puts the company at a competitive disadvantage in
attracting and retaining employees;190

•

The company’s policies are similar to those of many peer companies;191 and

•

Implementing protections for LGBT employees would “divert attention from the overall goal of a truly non-discriminatory workplace.”192

3. SEC Response to LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
a. Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive Proposals
This subsection describes the substantive grounds proffered by companies
and rejected by the SEC for excluding an LGBT-inclusive shareholder
proposal.
Rule 14a-8(i)(3) allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal if it
violates proxy rules193 (e.g., the Rule 14a-9 prohibition against making false
and misleading statements in a proxy statement).194 In 2004, OGE Energy
argued unsuccessfully that statements about LGBT employment discrimination and the competitive edge that can be gained from prohibiting such
discrimination are false and misleading because they imply that the company
currently discriminates against LGBT employees and that the company is at
a competitive disadvantage.195 The company also argued unsuccessfully that
statements about state and local legislation prohibiting LGBT employment

190 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 18 (“[T]he Company does not believe that
it suffers any competitive disadvantage in recruiting or retaining employees or in customer
relationships as a result of its employment practices or the language contained in its nondiscrimination policy.”); KBR, Inc., supra note 186, at 70 (“[W]e believe that our current policy against
discrimination and harassment and our procedures to ensure that discrimination does not occur,
put us in a position to recruit and retain a diverse workforce of many different cultures, races and
backgrounds who each contribute their unique experiences to KBR’s projects and customers.”).
191 See, e.g., TECO Energy, Inc., supra note 187, at 31 (“The proponent’s statement refers to
statistics which appear to present our company’s policies as being inconsistent with our peer
companies; however, our non-discrimination policy is actually similar to that of the vast majority
of other Fortune 1000 companies.”).
192 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 87 (Mar. 31, 2011)
(“It is not practical or even possible to list all categories on which to prohibit discrimination. The
Board believes that such an effort would only divert attention from the overall goal of a truly nondiscriminatory workplace.”).
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2013).
194 Id. § 240.14a-9.
195 See OGE Energy, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 351798, at *7-8 (Feb. 24, 2004)
(rejecting OGE’s characterization of a proposal as “false or misleading” based on their perceived
implication of a competitive disadvantage).

964

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 929

discrimination are false and misleading because they imply that the company
is violating the law.196
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal
“[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary
business operations.”197 Salary and other employment issues “go to the heart
of the ordinary business exclusion,” since management is likely to be in a
more informed position than shareholders to determine the salary levels
that would best attract and retain talent.198 However, in 1976, the SEC
created a “‘significant social policy’ exception to allow shareholder proposals
that raise important issues to be included in management’s proxy materials
even when those issues concern the company’s ordinary business.”199 In
1992, the SEC initially suggested, regarding the first LGBT-inclusive
proposal, “that employment-based proposals would be treated as ordinary
business decisions even if they raised significant social policy issues and
would therefore always be excludable by corporations”—the “Cracker Barrel
Standard.”200 However, in 1998, the SEC eliminated the Cracker Barrel
Standard, determining that “the relative importance of certain social issues
relating to employment matters has reemerged as a consistent topic of
widespread public debate.”201
The SEC now considers two factors in determining whether a proposal
falls within the ordinary business operations exclusion: (1) whether the
“task[ is] so fundamental to management’s ability to run [the] company on a
day-to-day basis that [it] could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct
shareholder oversight;” and (2) “the degree to which the proposal seeks to
‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex
nature upon which shareholders . . . would not be in a position to make an
informed judgment.”202 In 2008, the SEC granted a request by Apache Corporation to exclude an LGBT-inclusive proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)—the
exclusion was confirmed by a declaratory judgment in the Southern District
of Texas.203 The shareholder proponent’s proposal advocated for the adoption
of a nondiscrimination policy prohibiting discrimination across various facets

196 See id. at *11 (“The Company argues that these clauses [in the proposal] falsely imply that
OGE is violating state and local law. Again, [the SEC] do[es] not believe the statements imply
this . . . .”).
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
198 Roy, supra note 5, at 1523.
199 Id. at 1522 (footnote omitted).
200 Id. at 1524 (footnote omitted).
201 Id. at 1526.
202 Id. at 1526-27.
203 Id. at 1514.
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of the company’s culture, including “the recognition of employee
groups[,] . . . corporate advertising and marketing policy[, and] . . . corporate
charitable contributions to groups.”204 The court found that several of the
above principles in the shareholder resolution did not “implicate the
underlying social policy, [and that] the Proposal [sought to] micromanage
the company to an unacceptable degree.”205
This case seems to have ended the offering of LGBT-inclusive proposals
based on broad notions of nondiscrimination that affect matters outside of
direct employment policy, such as the Equality Principles. However, it does
not seem to have impacted the success of “plain-vanilla” proposals that
simply aim to include sexual orientation or gender identity in a company’s
existing EEO policy. Although companies have frequently attempted to exclude
proposals under the ordinary business operations exclusion, with the exception
of Apache Corporation, this approach has generally been unsuccessful.206
Rule 14a-8(i)(10) allows a company to exclude a shareholder “[i]f the
company has already substantially implemented the proposal.”207 In 2007
and 2009, the SEC refused to permit Armor Holdings, Incorporated and
Chesapeake Energy, respectively, to exclude shareholder proposals to add
both sexual orientation and gender identity to the companies’ EEO policies
on the basis of substantial implementation, when their current EEO policy
included only sexual orientation.208 In 2004, the SEC refused to permit
both OGE Energy, Incorporated and Emerson Electric Company to
exclude LGBT-inclusive shareholder proposals on the basis of substantial
implementation when they had not explicitly included the protected
characteristics—for example, “sexual orientation”—in their formal EEO
policies.209 Additionally, when the shareholder proposal requests that the
company amend its EEO policy, excluding the proposal and pointing to

204
205

Id. at 1513 n.6.
Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 2008 WL 1821728, No. 08-1064, at
*452-53 (Apr. 22, 2008).
206 See infra Tables 10-11 (enumerating unsuccessful and successful bases for exclusion).
207 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2013).
208 See Armor Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 1152669, at *6 (Apr. 3, 2007);
Chesapeake Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 926908 (Mar. 30, 2009).
209 See Emerson Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2495093, at *6 (Oct. 20, 2004)
(“[W]e believe that it is important for the Company to adopt a formal, written EEO policy including
the words ‘sexual orientation’ . . . . Mentioning sexual orientation in training materials is not a
substitute for including it an [sic] EEO policy . . . .”); OGE Energy, Inc., supra note 195, at *9-10.
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other human resources documents, such as an anti-harassment policy would
also not be sufficient.210
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) allows a company to exclude “[r]esubmissions” where
“the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another
proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the
company’s proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years.”211 In
2004, Emerson Electric argued that it could exclude a proposal because state
law requires it to consider abstentions and broker nonvotes in determining
whether the proposal passed, thus reducing the percentage of votes in favor
of the proposal, when compared to the percentages of votes for and
against.212 The SEC, however, had stated that, for the purposes of Rule 14a8(i)(12), the voting percentage should be determined using only votes cast
for and votes cast against the proposal, excluding abstensions.213 Therefore,
the SEC did not permit Emerson Electric to exclude the proposal on these
grounds, underscoring that Rule 14a-8(i)(12) is independent of state law
mandates for calculating voting percentages regarding approval of shareholder proposals.214
Table 10: Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive
Resolutions Proffered by Companies
Date of SEC Letter

Company

Failed Arguments for Exclusion

February 24, 2004

OGE Energy, Inc.

14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(10)

October 20, 2004

Emerson Electric Co.

March 2, 2006
April 3, 2007

Aquila, Inc.
Armor Holdings, Inc.

March 30, 2009

Chesapeake Energy Corp.

January 6, 2010

Verizon Communications, Inc.

March 20, 2012

Exxon Mobil

14a-8(i)(10), 14a-8(i)(12)
14a-8(i)(10)
14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(10)
14a-8(i)(10)
14a-8(b), 14a-8(f), 14a-8(i)(3)
14a-8(i)(7)

210 See Emerson Elec. Co., supra note 209, at *1-2 (presenting Emerson’s argument for substantial implementation on the bases of “an official company-wide policy barring all discrimination” and a “hotline for reporting discrimination and other complaints”).
211 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12). This rule further states that such proposals may be excluded
“from [the company’s] proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last
time it was included,” subject to certain voting thresholds. Id.
212 See Emerson Elec. Co., supra note 209, at *2 (including abstentions in the voting tabulation, and noting that the proposal in question had not garnered enough support to require
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials).
213 Id. at *8.
214 Id. at *7-8.
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b. Successful Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive Proposals
The SEC has infrequently permitted the exclusion of LGBT-inclusive
proposals. Of the four LGBT-inclusive resolutions I found that have been
excluded since 2000, two were excluded on procedural grounds.215 In 2009,
the SEC permitted American Financial Group to exclude a proposal based
on Rule 14a-8(h)(3) because neither the shareholder proponent nor a
representative appeared at the prior year’s annual meeting to present a
similar proposal.216 Additionally, the shareholder proponent failed to
provide “‘good cause’ for its failure to appear.”217 Further, in 2012, the SEC
permitted Alpha Natural Resources to exclude a proposal based on Rule 14a8(e)(2) because the shareholder proponent did not submit the proposal by
the deadline.218
I found two instances of the SEC permitting exclusion of LGBTinclusive proposals on substantive grounds.219 As discussed in the previous
subsection, in 2008, the SEC permitted Apache Corporation to exclude a
proposal on the basis of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because the proposal had a broad
notion of nondiscrimination that touched matters—such as marketing and
corporate donations—beyond direct employment matters that would be covered
by an EEO policy.220 Additionally, in 2009, the SEC permitted Commercial
Metals Company to exclude a proposal based on Rule 14a-8(i)(10), finding that
the company had substantially implemented the proposal’s recommendations
by amending its EEO policy to explicitly include sexual orientation and
gender identity.221
Not only has the SEC generally refused to issue favorable no-action letters on LGBT-inclusive resolutions, it has also generally not required
shareholder proponents to modify their proposals. In fact, I have found only
one such instance since 2000 in which the SEC permitted the company to
exclude the proposal, barring amendment by the shareholder.222 As discussed earlier in subsection III.B.4, employment-based shareholder proposals have a lower rate of omission than average among social policy
proposals—6.9% versus 15.2%.
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See infra Table 11.
Am. Fin. Grp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 800013, at *2 (Mar. 6, 2009).
Id.
Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 58, at *1.
See infra Table 11.
See supra notes 203-06.
Commercial Metals Co., supra note 131, at *1.
See Emerson Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1634117, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000)
(stating that the company may exclude an LGBT-inclusive proposal, unless the shareholder
proponent deletes a specific clause).
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Table 11: Successful Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive
Resolutions Proffered by Companies
Date of SEC Letter

Company

Successful Arguments for Exclusion

March 5, 2008

Apache Corp.

14a-8(i)(7)

March 6, 2009

American Financial Group

14a-8(h)(3)

November 5, 2009

Commercial Metals Co.

14a-8(i)(10)

March 5, 2012

Alpha Natural Resources

14a-8(e)(2)

B. LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions
1. Arguments Used by Shareholders for LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions
Shareholder proponents seeking to remove sexual orientation or gender
identity from a company’s EEO policies typically provide reasons that fall
within one or more of the following categories: (1) sexual orientation is a
private matter; (2) the company should not provide benefits to LGBT
individuals or their partners; and (3) society has traditionally discouraged or
prohibited homosexual acts.
a. Sexual Orientation Is a Private Matter
Shareholder proponents of LGBT-exclusive resolutions often argue that
sexual orientation is a private matter, particularly in the workplace. The
following are some of the arguments shareholder proponents have advanced
in support of this claim:
•

“[U]nlike the issues of race, age, gender and certain physical disabilities, it would be impossible to discern a person’s sexual orientation from
their appearance;”223

•

“[I]t would be inappropriate and possibly illegal to ask a job applicant
or employee about their sexual interests, inclinations and activities;”224

•

“[I]t is likewise inappropriate and legally problematic for employees to
discuss personal sexual matters on the job;”225 and

•

The U.S. Armed Forces had a “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy for eighteen
years.226

223
224
225

E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 77 (Apr. 2, 2012).
E.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18 (Mar. 22, 2006).
E.g., Ford Motor Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 56 (Apr. 7, 2006).
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b. The Company Should Not Provide Benefits to LGBT Individuals or Their
Partners
Shareholder proponents of LGBT-exclusive resolutions also argue that
including sexual orientation or gender identity in the company’s EEO
policy is a necessary precedent to offering benefits for domestic partners.227
Opposition to providing benefits for domestic partners is further fueled by
the belief that people who have same-sex relations are at an increased risk
for sexually transmitted diseases, and the company should not provide
benefits to people who willfully engage in risky behavior.228
c. Society Has Traditionally Discouraged or Prohibited Same-Sex Relations
Shareholder proponents have also posited that companies should remove
sexual orientation or gender identity from their nondiscrimination policies
because society has traditionally discouraged same-sex relations and encouraged marriage between heterosexuals. Some of the arguments shareholder
proponents have offered in support of this claim include the following:
•

“[Unmarried, homosexual] relations have been condemned by the major
traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam for a thousand years or
more;”229

•

“[M]arriage between heterosexuals has been protected and encouraged
by a wide range of societies, cultures and faiths for ages;”230 and

•

“[C]ohabitation, regardless of sexual orientation, is illegal in . . .
several . . . states.”231

226 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec., supra note 223, at 77 (“[T]he Armed Forces of the United
States is one of the largest and most diverse organizations in the world. They protected the
security of us all while adhering to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ regarding sexual interests for 18
years from 1993–2011.”).
227 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18 (“[A]ccording to the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the largest national lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender political organization, on
their website states, ‘an inclusive non-discrimination policy (one that refers to sexual orientation)
is a key facet of the rationale for extending domestic partner benefits.’ The HRC adds, ‘Establishing a benefits policy that includes your company’s gay and lesbian employees is a logical outgrowth
of your company’s own non-discrimination policy . . . .’” (omission in original)).
228 See, e.g., id. (“[O]ur company does not discriminate against tobacco users when they apply
for a job even though they are not protected by any employment clause. It also does not pay
tobacco users benefits based on their engaging in this personally risky behavior . . . . [T]hose who
engage in homosexual sex are at a significantly higher risk for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted
diseases.”).
229 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 77.
230 E.g., id.
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2. Companies’ Responses Against LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policies
As with LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, boards of directors often recommend against LGBT-exclusive policies.232 Boards of directors typically detail
the following categories of rationales for their recommendations: (1) implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy may spark litigation against the
company; (2) implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would harm
the company’s business; and (3) other arguments.
a. Implementing an LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policy May Spark Litigation Against
the Company
Boards of directors have warned shareholders of the risk of lawsuits resulting from removing sexual orientation or gender identity from the
company’s EEO policy, arguing the following:
•

Implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy may incite “lawsuits
that could diminish shareholder value;”233 and

•

Implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would result in violations of the laws of many states and cities that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.234

b. Implementing an LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policy Would Harm the Company’s
Business
In addition to the above, companies have also described various ways in
which an EEO policy without reference to sexual orientation or gender
identity would hurt the company’s business, such as the following:
•

231
232

An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would hinder the company’s ability to
maintain a diverse workforce;235 and

E.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 56-57 (opposing a proposal to amend Ford’s
EEO policy to exclude any reference to privacy issues related to sexual interests, activities, or
orientation).
233 E.g., Bank of Am., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 45 (Mar. 20, 2006).
234 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 78 (“The proposed amendment to the Policy
Statement (i.e., deletion of any reference to sexual orientation) would make the Policy Statement
inconsistent with California state law, which prohibits harassment and discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.”).
235 E.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 57 (“Ford, and numerous other leading companies, believe that a diverse workforce, free of discrimination, is the most advantageous environment to attract and retain talented employees and to allow them to excel in their jobs.
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An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would hinder the ability of the company to work with clients that are prohibited from doing business with
entities “that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”236

c. Other Arguments
Other arguments that boards of directors have advanced in opposition to
LGBT-exclusive resolutions include the following:
•

An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy “would prevent the company from
providing employee benefits to domestic partners;”237

•

The proposal would interfere with management’s ability to run the
company on a day-to-day basis, and would thus be adverse to shareholders’ interests;238

•

The proposal “is not in the best interests of the shareholders or the
Company;”239 and

•

Anti-LGBT rights proposals are contrary to the core values of the
company.240

3. SEC Responses to LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions
LGBT-exclusive resolutions have been far more susceptible than LGBTinclusive resolutions to modification by the SEC. I did not, however, find
any LGBT-exclusive resolutions, since 2000, that the SEC permitted to be

Implementing the proposal would adversely affect Ford’s ability to attract and retain talented
employees.”).
236 See, e.g., Bank of Am., supra note 233, at 45 (“[M]any state and local laws prohibit state
and municipal governments from doing business with companies that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation. Without an inclusive equal employment opportunity policy the Corporation
would not be able to obtain contracts with these entities.”).
237 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 19.
238 See, e.g., id. (“The proposal is also unwise because it deals with employee matters that
relate solely to the Company’s ordinary business operations. Certain tasks, such as constructing
employment policies that are designed to attract and retain an effective workforce, are fundamental
to management’s ability to run a company on a day to day basis and should not be assigned to
shareholders to decide.”).
239 E.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 57.
240 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 78 (“Implementing the proposal and
amending the Policy Statement would be contrary to the fact that [the Corporation] is committed
to protecting its employees against discrimination and harassment of any nature, including
discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation. This would also conflict with the
Corporation’s value of respecting each other and celebrating our diversity.”).
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excluded in their entirety.241 Upon request by companies to exclude LGBTexclusive resolutions, the SEC has typically advised that only certain of the
shareholder proponent’s arguments be deleted, recast as an opinion, or
offered in conjunction with factual support in the form of citation to
specific sources.242 The SEC generally advises shareholder proponents to
delete arguments linking LGBT individuals to inflammatory stereotypes—
for example, pedophilia and a higher risk of contracting sexually transmitted
diseases—from the resolution.243 The SEC also recommends that shareholder proponents recast arguments discussing the opinions of employees,
potential employees, shareholders, or customers as opinions or support
them with facts, including citations.244
The SEC’s extensive line-editing approach reflects its stance that employment-based proposals concerning nondiscrimination policies are
generally includable in companies’ proxy materials, whether or not they are
LGBT-inclusive or LGBT-exclusive. However, while social policy proposals
inherently take a social or political position that is sometimes controversial,
proxy materials must not become a platform for voicing inflammatory
views. In lieu of excluding an LGBT-exclusive proposal containing inflammatory statements in its entirety, the SEC has extensively line-edited them
under the rationale that such statements are “false and misleading” under
Rule 14a-9.245 Whether a statement is considered too inflammatory to be
included in a company’s proxy materials seems to be a value-based decision
dependent on the individual SEC reviewer and contemporary social mores.
The SEC has typically rebuffed company’s efforts to exclude LGBTexclusive resolutions in their entirety. Companies have proffered (and the SEC
has rejected) Rules 14a-8(i)(3) (violation of proxy rules)246 and 14a-8(i)(7)
(management functions)247 as grounds for excluding such proposals.

241
242
243

See infra Table 12.
Id.
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 122319, at *4 (Jan. 7, 2003)
(permitting the company to exclude the proposal if the shareholder proponent does not delete the
following clause: “Research proves promoting homosexual lifestyles such as those in the Company’s diversity programs promote pedophilia.”).
244 See, e.g., Boeing, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 32063404, at *1, *5-6 (Feb. 13, 2002)
(stating that the company may exclude the proposal if the shareholder proponent does not recast
the following sentence as an opinion: “The Company’s diversity policy offends some current
employees, and has contributed to eroding employee morale.”).
245 See generally infra Table 12.
246 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2013).
247 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
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Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits a company to exclude shareholder proposals that
violate “any of the Commission’s proxy rules, including [Rule] 240.14a-9,248
which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting
materials.”249 Companies seeking to exclude LGBT-exclusive proposals on
this basis have typically argued that the proposal is false and misleading in
two ways: First, companies have argued unsuccessfully that characterizing
an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy as “neutral” with respect to sexual orientation is misleading because the shareholder proponent is advancing arguments that are laden with negative value judgments about LGBT
individuals.250 Second, companies have argued, with mixed results, that
certain portions of a proposal are false and misleading. While I have not
found an instance where the SEC has allowed a company to exclude an
LGBT-exclusive proposal in its entirety since 2000,251 it will often require
shareholder proponents to modify language contained in their proposals, as
demonstrated in Table 12 below.

248
249
250

Id. § 240.14a-9.
Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(3).
See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 475447, at *5 (Feb. 22,
2006) (rejecting the company’s argument to exclude an LGBT-exclusive proposal as false and
misleading because “the confusing and conflicting portions of the supporting statement of the
Proposal, combined with the seemingly neutral language of the proposed resolution, create an
uncertainty as to the subject matter of the vote in the current instance”).
251 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., supra note 243, at *1 (requiring the shareholder proponent to
modify its proposal based on Rule 14a-8(i)(3), rather than exclude the proposal in its entirety).
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Table 12: SEC Recommendations for LGBT-Exclusive Resolution
Modifications to Permit Inclusion in Company’s Proxy Materials
Date of SEC
Letter

SEC Recommendation/
Rationale

Company

Statement

AT&T Corp.

“Whereas, some people are inclined to
engage in sexual activity with members of
the opposite sex, some people are inclined
to engage in sexual activity with members
of their own sex, some people are inclined
to engage in sexual activity with members
of both sexes, some people are inclined to
engage in sexual activity with children, and
some people are even inclined to engage in
sexual activity with animals.”

Delete (14a-9)

Feb. 13, 2002

Boeing

“The Company’s decision to adopt written
policies which include sexual orientation in
a diversity blueprint and to bar discrimination based upon sexual orientation in all
employment practices, has contributed to
eroding employee morale in the Company,
and otherwise could adversely impact the
Company’s business operations.”

Recast as an opinion (14a-9)

Feb. 13, 2002

Boeing

“The Company’s diversity policy offends
some current employees [and] has
contributed to eroding employee morale.”

Recast as an opinion (14a-9)

Feb. 13, 2002

Boeing

“Potential employees may also be deterred
from seeking employment with the
Company.”

Recast as an opinion (14a-9)

Feb. 13, 2002

Boeing

“Some skilled employees have sought
employment elsewhere because of these
policies.”

Delete (14a-9)

Boeing

“The proposal would not preclude the
Company from complying with the laws in
specific jurisdictions which preclude
discrimination based upon sexual
orientation.”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

“The Company has incorporated in its
‘diversity’ program the promotion of
alternative deviant sexual lifestyles into the
company through promotion of the ‘Atlanta
Pride,’ homosexual festival, and offering
employee benefits to ‘domestic partners.’”

Delete “promotion of
alternative deviant sexual
lifestyles into the company
through promotion of the
‘Atlanta Pride,’ homosexual
festival, and” (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

“Research proves promoting homosexual
lifestyles such as those in the Company’s
diversity programs promote pedophilia.”

Delete (14a-9)

Feb. 28, 2001

Feb. 13, 2002
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Coca-Cola

“Many oppose policies offering special
rights based on ‘sexual orientation.’”

Identify the “special rights”
(14a-9)

Coca-Cola

“The promotion of deviant sexual lifestyles
through the support of homosexual rights
rallies, diversity training, and rewarding
homosexual partners with the benefits of
spouses of the opposite sex of married
employees, has contributed to eroding
employee morale, which impacts the
Company’s business operations, including a
drop in stock prices and performance of the
Company.”

Provide factual support in
the form of citation to a
specific source (14a-9)

Coca-Cola

“When put to a vote of citizens in
government or shareholders in corporations,
policies to reward deviant sexual behavior
such as homosexuality have been rejected,
most notable by Emerson Electric and
Exxon Mobil.”

Provide factual support in
the form of citation to a
specific source (14a-9)

Coca-Cola

“Sexual orientation in the Company’s
diversity and equal employment opportunity
policies has popularity with a minority of
the Company’s customers, employees and
shareholders, but offends most because of
their deeply held moral and religious
beliefs.”

Provide factual support in
the form of citation to a
specific source (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

“The American Psychiatric Association
declared homosexuality a psychiatric
problem until homosexual rights activists
changed it in 1973, and rewarding a
psychiatric problem as a normal lifestyle
will not help but rather harm the company.”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

“As for pedophilia, the 1979 The Gay Report
reported 73% of surveyed homosexuals
admitted pedophilia.”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

“The International Lesbian and Gay
Association features pedophile groups,
causing the United Nations to exclude it
from the List of Non-Governmental
Organisations.”

Provide factual support in
the form of a citation to a
specific source (14a-9)

Jan. 26, 2006

Int’l Business
Machines

“Whereas: Thomas Jefferson said in A Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom, ‘To
compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions
which he believes is sinful and tyrannical.’”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 7, 2003

Jan. 7, 2003

Jan. 7, 2003

Jan. 7, 2003
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Int’l Business
Machines

“Charitable contributions come from the
fruit of our employee’s labor and belong to
all shareholders as a group.”

Delete (14a-9)

Int’l Business
Machines

“While there are thousands of charitable
organizations, some charitable groups focus
on shared sexual interests, especially the
sexual interests of homosexuals, bisexuals
and those persons who feel the sexual
identity they were born with does not
comport with their preferred ‘gender
expression’ or ‘gender identity.’ Individuals
in this later group are sometimes referred to
as transgendered.”

Delete (14a-9)

Int’l Business
Machines

“According to Karla Jay and Allen Young in
their book, “The Gay Report (Summit
Books, 1979),” 99% of homosexual males
engage in oral sex, 91% engage in anal sex,
82% engage in ‘rimming,’ 22% engage in
‘fisting’ and 23% engage in ‘golden
showers.’”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 26, 2006

Int’l Business
Machines

“According to 1999 Medical Institute of
Sexual Health report, ‘Homosexual men are
at significantly increased risk of HIV/AIDS,
hepatitis, anal cancer, gonorrhea, and
gastrointestinal infections as a result of
their sexual practices.’”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 26, 2006

Int’l Business
Machines

“Whereas, those who engage in homosexual
sex are at a significantly higher risk for
HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted
diseases.”

Delete (14a-9)

Jan. 26, 2006

Jan. 26, 2006

Jan. 26, 2006

Table 13: Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions
Company

Company’s Failed
Argument

January 7, 2003

Coca-Cola

14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(3)

January 26, 2006

Int’l Business Machines, Corp.

Date

14a-8(i)(3)

February 22, 2006

Bank of America Corp.

14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7)

February 22, 2006

JP Morgan Chase & Co.

14a-8(i)(7)

February 23, 2006

Am. Express Co.

14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7)

March 6, 2006

Ford Motor Co.

14a-8(i)(7)

PG&E Corp.

14a-8(i)(6)

February 24, 2011
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CONCLUSION
LGBT-inclusive proposals have been extraordinarily successful at effecting
change. When analyzing only proposals that were brought to a shareholder
vote, this Comment is in line with previous research that concludes that
such proposals typically fail—in fact, only 5 out of the 69 LGBT-inclusive
proposals brought to a vote from 2005 to 2012 received support from the
majority of shareholders.252 LGBT-inclusive proposals received, on average,
a not-insignificant 30.0% of the shareholder vote.253 Additionally, recent
proxy seasons have yielded higher percentages of favorable votes, likely due
to a multitude of factors, including increased adoption of inclusive policies
among peer companies and changing social mores.254 However, compared to
other social policy issues, employment-based shareholder proposals are less
frequently brought to a vote and more frequently resolved in negotiations
between shareholder proponents and companies. Accounting for the
number of proposals that are withdrawn in exchange for company concessions, the success rate is much higher. Fifty-nine percent of LGBT-inclusive
proposals filed between 2005 and 2012 were immediately successful, resulting
in an inclusive EEO policy.255 Of the 33 companies where LGBT-inclusive
proposals initially failed, 21 ultimately adopted inclusive EEO policies—10
of which were due to direct shareholder action, such as a shareholder vote or
a withdrawn proposal.256 Although companies often resist including such
proposals in their proxy materials,257 the SEC has generally rebuffed their
requests to exclude such proposals258 and has insisted on minimal modification of them, unlike their treatment of LGBT-exclusive proposals.259
This Comment demonstrates that LGBT-inclusive proposals have been
an important catalyst for change in corporate nondiscrimination policies.
That such change does not result from a shareholder vote yielding majority
support, or, in many cases, a shareholder vote at all, underscores the importance of shareholder proposals in (1) bringing social issues to the attention of shareholders, management, and the public, and (2) facilitating
dialogue among these groups—both of which result in tangible change.

252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

See supra Table 6.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 9.
See supra Table 6.
See supra Table 7.
See supra subsection IV.A.2.
See supra subsection IV.A.3.
See supra subsection IV.B.3.

